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THE BODY IN SOCIAL CONTEXT:
SOME QUALIFICATIONS ON THE ‘WARMTH AND




In this paper I examine William James’ concept of the ‘warmth and intimacy’ 
of bodily self-consciousness and relate it to recent attempts to recast bodily self-
consciousness in strictly neural terms. James takes bodily ‘warmth and intimacy’ 
to solve a number of problems related to the material and spiritual aspects of 
self and personal identity. He mentions but does not fully explore the possible 
disruptions in the bodily sense of ownership that can come about as the result 
of experimental and pathological circumstances, and that would have to qualify 
such solutions. I argue that an explanation in strictly neuroscientifi c terms does 
no better in accounting for bodily self-consciousness. Both James and proponents 
of the ‘body-in-the-brain’ theory ignore the social aspects of the self and the role 
they play in accounting for bodily self-consciousness and its various disruptions.
My awareness of my body, when, as in most cases, it is accompanied by a 
sense of ownership, that is, a sense that this body is my body, is a form of 
self-consciousness.2 In this regard, the body consciously appears, not as a 
perceived object external to the self over which one claims ownership, but 
1. Th is paper was motivated by a discussion I had in November 2009 with my friend John 
Michael Krois at Humboldt University and on a walk in the nearby areas of Berlin which included 
a visit to the building where William James stayed while in that city. John died unexpectedly 
and too young in the Fall of 2010. I dedicate this paper to his memory. An earlier version of 
this paper was presented at the Meaning and Mindedness public lecture series at the Travistock 
Clinic, University of London in March 2011. I’ve also benefi ted from comments by Anthony J. 
Marcel, Frederique de Vignemont and Glenn Carruthers on an earlier draft.
2. I employ a certain looseness of terminology throughout this paper in regard to the notion 
of awareness or consciousness of one’s own body. Rather than using an abbreviation to attain a 
precision that may not refl ect the kind of ambiguous phenomenon under discussion, I prefer 
to stay with a set of what I take here to be more or less equivalent phrases: ‘self-consciousness 
of one’s body,’ ‘bodily self-consciousness’, ‘bodily self-awareness’. 
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rather, pre-refl ectively, as the perceiving subject or agent that I am. William 
James (1890) called this an aspect of the “material Self.” Th is kind of self-
consciousness seems unproblematic for James. I say this for two reasons. 
First, he no sooner introduces the idea than he abandons discussion of it 
and moves on to talk about other aspects of the material self, such as the 
clothes that we wear. Indeed, he devotes only one-half sentence to it in 
his chapter on “Th e Consciousness of Self ” in his Principles of Psychology: 
“certain parts of the body seem more intimately ours than the rest” (292). 
If this is a problem, he does not come back to it as such. Second, to put 
this most precisely, when he does come back to this idea, he comes back to 
it, not as a problem, but as a solution, and as a way to defl ate the concept 
of the spiritual self. After doing a bit of phenomenological description of 
the stream of experience, he comes to the idea that the central core of this 
spiritual self is something felt, and it is just here that the body comes back 
on the scene. Th e central nucleus of the self is felt, “just as the body is felt” 
(299). Which means, for James, that it is felt as an abstraction.
What James means by saying that the body is felt as an abstraction is, 
curiously, just the opposite of what we might think. He means that it is 
never felt as an abstraction: the self is felt, “just as the body is felt, the feel-
ing of which is also an abstraction, because never is the body felt all alone, 
but always together with other things” (299). James’ claim, however, is 
stronger than simply positing an analogy between the feeling of the body 
and the feeling of the self. Rather, the former is the solution to the ques-
tion, “What do we feel (i.e., experience) when we feel the central nucleus 
of the spiritual self?” His answer is that we feel the body. “Whenever my 
introspective glance succeeds in turning round quickly enough to catch 
one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel 
distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the 
head” (300). ‘Within the head’ does not mean ‘in the brain’, but instead 
physical movements in and of the head. He goes into some details about 
eye movements that accompany the thinking and visualizing of things 
in the stream of consciousness, movements of the mechanisms of throat, 
mouth, and jaw-muscles, of the brow, etc., which then give way to feelings 
connected with “many body parts” and the body as a “larger mass.” Th is 
solution is repeated numerous times under the heading of “the feeling of 
warmth and intimacy,” which is the feeling of the body. Th is frames his 
solution to the problem of personal identity, for example. Our thoughts, 
as they stream along, are felt “with warmth and intimacy.”
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Of course this is the case with the bodily part of it; we feel the whole cubic 
mass of our body all the while, it gives us an unceasing sense of personal 
existence. Equally do we feel the inner ‘nucleus of the spiritual self,’ either in 
the shape of yon faint physiological adjustments, or (adopting the universal 
psychological belief ), in that of the pure activity of our thought taking place 
as such. Our remoter spiritual, material, and social selves, so far as they 
are realized, come also with a glow and a warmth; for the thought of them 
infallibly brings some degree of organic emotion in the shape of quickened 
heart-beats, oppressed breathing, or some other alteration, even though it 
be a slight one, in the general bodily tone. Th e character of ‘warmth,’ then, 
in the present self, reduces itself to either of two things, - something in the 
feeling which we have of the thought itself, as thinking, or else the feeling 
of the body’s actual existence at the moment, - or fi nally to both. We cannot 
realize our present self without simultaneously feeling one or other of these 
two things. Any other fact which brings these two things with it into con-
sciousness will be thought with a warmth and an intimacy like those which 
cling to the present self. (333)
Th e parentheses that mark “the universal psychological belief ” signal 
a doubt that James has about the concept of the “pure activity of our 
thought”; the parentheses appear again (this time with a question mark) 
later in the text: “A uniform feeling of ‘warmth’, of bodily existence (or an 
equally uniform feeling of pure psychic energy?) pervades [all self experi-
ence]” (335). What James knows for sure is that the feelings of warmth 
and intimacy that belong to the self are bodily in nature.
In recent philosophy and science, in contexts that still involve questions 
about self and self-consciousness, but in contrast to James, this feeling 
or experience of the body is itself taken to be the locus of a set of prob-
lems rather than a solution to other problems. In this paper I discuss the 
problems associated with the self-awareness of the body, to see how they 
complicate the issues that James thought were solved by this experience. 
My strategy is to review some recent research on the concepts of body 
image and body schema that explores issues pertaining to the awareness 
of one’s own body. Th e qualifi cations on ‘warmth and intimacy’ that I 
want to introduce come by way of looking at some pathological disorders 
that involve bodily self-awareness. Th e idea is not simply that things can 
go wrong with bodily self-awareness—surely something that James was 
knowledgeable about—but that bodily self-awareness, no less than other 
aspects of the material self, is not a mere private or personal aspect of the 
self, but is already permeated by intersubjective or social dimensions. In 
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James’ terms, the social self is not as “remote” from bodily self-awareness 
as James may have thought.
1. Body image and body schema
We need a way to think about the role that the body (or embodiment) 
plays in consciousness and cognition, and we need a way to think about 
pathologies that aff ect embodiment—including those that disrupt move-
ment, action, and agency as well as bodily self-awareness, the sense of own-
ership for one’s body and one’s action, and self-identity. I have defended 
the rather contentious idea that the concepts of body image and body 
schema, if properly distinguished, while not the basis for a complete expla-
nation, can still do some useful work in this regard (Gallagher 2005). Th e 
historical imprecision and lack of clarity associated with these concepts, 
however, have motivated some (e.g., Straus 1967; Poeck and Orgass 1971; 
Spicker, 1975; Critchley 1979) to suggest alternative approaches, and even 
to abandon these concepts. One alternative suggestion is that the best way 
to approach questions about bodily self-awareness and the role of the body 
in pathological and non-pathological experience is to focus on ‘the body 
in the brain’ (Berlucchi and Aglioti 1997; 2010). Th at is, the alternative 
strategy is to frame the discussion in terms of the neural correlates of the 
various aspects of self-awareness, agency, ownership, self-identity, etc. My 
intention is not to dismiss this strategy, which I think provides important 
and essential knowledge about how bodily experience works and breaks 
down; rather my intention is to argue (1) that this strategy also has its 
problems insofar as we still run into complex ambiguities when it comes 
to mapping out brain function, and (2) that this strategy is not suffi  cient 
in itself, even if such ambiguities can be resolved. In this regard I want to 
point to an overlooked virtue to be found in the concepts of body image 
and body schema—a virtue overlooked and entirely underexploited to such 
an extent that, as I present it, it may look as if I’m introducing something 
completely diff erent into the discussion.
What is often overlooked and underexploited in regard to body image/
body schema is the intersubjective or social aspect implicit in these phe-
nomena and in embodied experience generally. Moreover, in the alterna-
tive proposal that looks for the body in the brain, what is almost always 
neglected is the way the body is dynamically coupled to an environment 
that is primarily a social environment. Th e idea, then, is that body image 
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and body schema are not just an individual subject’s representations of his 
or her individual body, which may then come to be related to others that 
we encounter in the environment, but that body image and body schema 
are constitutionally referenced to others and are implicitly intersubjective.
It will be best to start with a characterization of the conceptual distinc-
tion between body image and body schema. Th is, at least, is the one I 
defend (Gallagher 2005), and the one that is under discussion in a number 
of recent theoretical and experimental papers, some of which I mention 
below. A body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and 
beliefs pertaining to one’s own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system 
of sensory-motor capacities that function normally without awareness or 
the necessity of perceptual monitoring that takes the body as an object. 
Th e diff erence is one between having a perception of (or belief about) 
something and having a capacity to move (or an ability to do something). 
Body image is not limited to occurrent perceptions. It includes beliefs 
about the body and attitudes towards the body. In contrast, the body 
schema involves motor control processes, motor capacities, abilities, and 
habits that both enable and constrain movement and the maintenance of 
posture. Th e body schema continues to operate, and in many cases oper-
ates best, when the intentional object of perception is something other 
than one’s own body.
Th is conceptual distinction is just that, a conceptual distinction. In this 
respect, it’s necessary to point out two things. First, that in our normal 
everyday behavior and action, body image and body schema interact in an 
integrated manner and are diffi  cult to distinguish, both phenomenologi-
cally and neurologically (Gallagher 2005; Kammers 2008)—it may be the 
case, for example, that we rely on both in the learning of a new movement, 
and/or that there is some overlap in brain processes that are related to both 
body image and body schema. Second, the distinction may be helpful in 
explaining some aspects of movement and motor control, body awareness, 
and certain related pathologies, but it is not meant as a complete expla-
nation. Th e idea that it may be helpful to understand a problem as one 
involving the body schema rather than the body image, for example, may 
mean simply that in explaining or addressing the problem, the distinction 
may point us to diff erent neurological or psychological factors. Let me also 
note here (and see below) that this distinction cuts across the conscious 
vs non-conscious distinction; while most aspects of body image can be, 
or can be made conscious, not all aspects are always conscious. And while 
most aspects of body-schematic processes are non-conscious, this does not 
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rule out the possibility that such processes may generate a pre-refl ective 
form of body awareness, or that we may become more explicitly aware of 
some aspects of how our body is moving. For example, if during a game, 
I am chasing a ball, I am likely aware of my bodily movement and that I 
am moving fast enough or not fast enough to catch the ball. Th is does not 
entail an explicit or detailed consciousness of body-schematic processes 
such as the controlled dynamics of my leg movements although, in part, 
it may those controlled dynamics that generate the a sense of eff ort and 
speed that I feel.
Over the years, as I mentioned, there have been various calls to abandon 
the these concepts. In the latest version of this critique, Berlucchi and 
Aglioti (2010) focus on some problems involved in the awareness of one’s 
body. Th ey note the confused history and terminological wars associated 
with the concepts of body image and body schema, and they begin with 
the distinction as defi ned above, and as it is proposed by Paillard (1999) 
and in my own work (Gallagher 1986; 2005).
Both Paillard and I appeal to double dissociations to indicate empirical 
support for the distinction. Th us, for example, in certain cases of unilateral 
neglect, stroke victims who do not notice or acknowledge the left side of 
their bodies, still employ the left hand to do certain things (such as dress-
ing), and their left leg to walk. Th is is a case where there are severe body 
image problems, but intact body schema. Th e other side of the dissocia-
tion can be seen in deaff erented patients such as IW (Gallagher and Cole 
1996) who, because of the loss of proprioception and the tactile modality 
below the neck, must use conscious visual monitoring to control their 
movement. In this case, we have a severe defi ciency in body schematic 
processes, and an enhanced, vision-based body image taking over aspects of 
motor control usually accomplished by those processes (Gallagher 2005).3 
3. Vignemont (2010) challenges this particular interpretation. She suggests that deaf-
ferented subjects still have an intact body schema, except that it is guided by vision instead of 
proprioception. But if non-conscious visual perception (something that certainly can contribute 
to body-schematic processes) should count as part of a body image, as Vignemont suggests in 
the case of unilateral neglect, it’s not clear why conscious visual perception (which deaff erented 
agents need to guide their movement) would not count as part of body image. Th e issue here, 
and more generally, is not what sensory inputs are involved (vision versus proprioception), but 
how much non-automatic, and often thoughtful, attentive control (using the body image) is 
required. In this regard, Vignemont is clearly incorrect when she suggests that deaff erented 
patients like IW or GL are like “automatic drivers” whose actions become automatic routines 
after signifi cant practice. Although some aspects of gait seem close to automatic in IW, in all 
other regards he is unable to form motor programs or motor habits that would allow him to 
walk or reach or grasp, etc. automatically (or close to automatically), i.e., without consciously 
109
As pointed out by Vignemont (2010), one can fi nd a similar dissociation 
between body image and body schema in the rubber hand illusion where 
there is a proprioceptive drift toward the rubber hand for the perceptual 
response in judging where one’s hidden hand is, but no proprioceptive 
drift for the motor responses when one is asked to reach to touch one’s 
hand without vision (Kammers et al. 2009).4 Further empirical support is 
provided by Dijkerman and de Haan (2007; also see Anema et al. 2009) 
who show that there are two partly divided anatomical and functional 
systems: one responsible for the immediate and automatic guidance of 
action, centered in the posterior parietal cortex, and the other responsible 
for conscious body perception centered in the insula. As Berlucchi and 
Aglioti (2010) note, however, this is not an absolutely clean neurological 
independence. Just like the two-pathway visual processing systems pro-
posed by Milner and Goodale (1995), there are various ways in which 
these systems integrate. Th us, processes in the posterior parietal cortex, 
diff erent from those that guide action may also be involved in high-level 
visuo-spatial and semantic consciousness of the body; and we know from 
other studies, that the insula is involved in sensory integration and motor 
control processes (Farrer and Frith 2003; Farrer et al. 2003).
With respect to the issue of body awareness, it’s important to point 
out that although there is an obvious involvement of the body image, 
which may involve conscious perception of the body, but also beliefs and 
thinking about what he is doing and monitoring his movement and posture. Clearly, the need 
for this attentive monitoring is what a body schema eliminates. 
4. See Kammers et al. (2010) for some interesting complications with this dissociation using 
tasks that involve grasping. Th eir earlier study showed that body schema was immune to the 
illusion while the body image was not; the 2010 study, however, shows that the body schema 
can also be susceptible to the illusion. Th e researchers conclude that although there are still good 
reasons to distinguish between body image and body schema, “the motoric body representa-
tion is not intrinsically robust to bodily illusion” (211). For a more complete discussion and a 
dynamical approach that focuses more on the integrated functioning of body image and body 
schema than on dissociations, see Kammers (2008). Rohde et al. 2011, show a dissociation in 
the RHI between proprioceptive drift and the sense of ownership, where the former (but not 
the latter) can be initiated by vision alone, without tactile stimulation, as well as by short-term 
(but not by continuous exposure to) asynchronous tactile stimulation. Also see Marcel’s work 
on postural illusions induced by muscle spindle vibration (see e.g., Marcel 2003). Initially, 
while conscious perception of the body succumbs to the illusion, movement is correct. Marcel 
suggests that the body schema is entirely responsive to the real and true determinate locational 
information of body parts and target, but body image is not. Marcel also shows, however, that 
if the signal to the subject to move is delayed, the longer the delay (up to around 9 secs), the 
more the movement is captured by the perceptual illusion. Th e illusory aspects of body image 
start to control movement and movement becomes progressively determined by the illusion.
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aff ective attitudes that can be made conscious, there is also a role for the 
body schema to play. Proprioceptive and kinaesthetic processes that feed 
body-schematic functions involved in motor control may also contribute 
to a pre-refl ective self-awareness of my bodily posture and movement. Like 
the self-experience involved in Gibson’s notion of ecological perception 
(which is an important factor in body-schematic control) this pre-refl ective 
bodily experience remains tacit or recessive in my experience of the world. 
Accordingly, the distinction between body image and body schema doesn’t 
carve things up in the same way as the distinction between conscious and 
non-conscious.
Berlucchi and Aglioti (2010) argue that the body image—body schema 
distinction does not adequately account for a certain category of body 
awareness, which is involved in body-directed action. Specifi cally, it doesn’t 
account for the possible role of such phenomena as itch, pain, tempera-
ture sensations based on small-fi bre aff erent systems. Th ey make a good 
point, which goes back to the original work on the body schema by Head 
and Holmes (1911/12). Th ese researchers proposed two body schema 
systems—one for posture and the other for the localization of sensations 
on the body surface. It’s also true, as Berlucchi and Aglioti point out, that 
these small-fi bre systems are still intact in IW—his neuropathy aff ected 
only the large-fi bres of the peripheral nervous system, which deliver infor-
mation about proprioception and touch to the brain. Berlucchi and Aglioti 
then suggest, citing an unpublished study by Olausson, that this aspect 
of the body schema allows IW to fi nd and scratch an itch, and that it 
thus has “the potential to guide motor actions, more specifi cally actions 
aimed at the body itself in absence of proprioception and fi ne touch.” 
(28). Berlucchi and Aglioti fail to mention, however, that this is the case 
if IW knows where his limbs are by some other means, e.g., by vision. In 
other words, although IW has a pain, temperature, and itch map of his 
body that would allow him to fi nd the point on his leg that needs atten-
tion, he lacks a proprioceptive body map that would tell him how that leg 
was postured. In some cases5 he would have to fi rst locate the leg using 
vision; only then would he be able to go to the itch in a normal fashion, 
assuming he also knew the starting posture for the hand he needs to do 
the scratching. Moreover, the intact aspect of this body schema does not 
5. Th ere are some cases in which IW uses temperature as a cue for position sense. While 
sitting, for example, he rests his hands on his legs. He can tell from temperature cues, perhaps a 
literal part of what James calls ‘warmth and intimacy’, where his hands and his legs are. I thank 
Jonathan Cole some clarifi cations about IW on these various points.
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assist IW in guiding motor actions more generally than just, for example, 
fi nding the itch within a framework established by other means. Th e point 
is that these body schemas do not operate in an isolated fashion; they are 
normally quite integrated.
Berlucchi and Aglioti also cite the case of Schneider, the patient of Gelb 
and Goldstein made famous in phenomenological circles by Merleau-
Ponty (1962). Here, I think, they get things wrong. Th ey suggest that 
Schneider suff ered from the lack of the “classic body schema”—i.e., the 
postural body schema—but was able to scratch an itch when necessary. 
Schneider’s problems were much more complicated than IW; the latter 
does not have brain damage, where as Schneider’s brain damage was likely 
quite serious given that it was from a wound from mine splinters to the 
head, although the full extent of his injuries remain unclear.6 Specifi cally, 
however, Schneider had trouble moving to order, or following instructions 
to make, what Goldstein called “abstract” movements. He had no trouble 
with “concrete” or habitual movements, like walking, sitting, maintain-
ing posture or more generally with the automatic aspects of controlling 
movement. His trouble occurred when refl ective regard to his own body 
parts were involved in the action. In other words, his problem was with 
body image rather than the body schema.
Coming back to the idea that the body image—body schema distinc-
tion is not meant to explain everything, it is surprising that Berlucchi 
and Aglioti, after using the distinction to sort out issues pertaining to 
some aspects of bodily experience and pathology, go on to dismiss the 
distinction (which they call “vague”), joining a select tradition of theo-
rists who like to throw up their hands in exasperated response to termi-
nological confusion, the terms being so misused in diff erent senses from 
one author to another. To throw up their hands, of course, they required 
their respective body schemas, and I’m not sure how they will do without 
them. Th ey express some satisfaction, however, with a recent distinction 
by Carruthers (2008a&b) between online and offl  ine representations of 
the body. Th e distinction is similar to O’Shaughnessy’s (1980) distinction 
between long-term body image (knowledge about stable aspects of one’s 
body over time—e.g., that I have two arms) and short-term body image 
(knowledge about current posture—e.g., where my arms are right now). 
6. Th e complexity of Schneider’s case is signifi cant enough in terms of the neurological and 
behavioral data as it is presented by Gelb and Goldstein, and as discussed by Merleau-Ponty. 
Th ings are even more complicated if Goldenberg (2003) is correct about Schneider faking some 
of his symptoms. See Marotta and Behrmann (2004) for discussion.
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Once we consider action, however, the long-term (offl  ine) and short-term 
(online) distinction, applies equally to the body schema, and indeed cuts 
across (but cannot replace, pace Berlucchi and Aglioti) the body image—
body schema distinction (see Tsakiris and Fotopoulo 2008 for discussion). 
Indeed, as Carruthers (personal correspondence) makes clear, the on-line/
off -line distinction was never intended as a replacement for the image/
schema distinction. Th e prior is meant as a distinction in representations 
(by their content) and the later a distinction in capacities that are not 
reducible to representations. Does calling body image and body schema 
‘body representations’, as Berlucchi and Aglioti and others do, help to 
reduce vagueness? Recent work in philosophy of mind suggests that use of 
the term ‘representation’ in the cognitive sciences is growing more vague 
every day (see, e.g., Ramsey 2007; Gallagher 2008c; Hutto 2008).
Berlucchi and Aglioti, however, are more generally dissatisfi ed because 
we have no understanding of the neuroscience of a large number of body-
related pathologies: “virtually nothing is known about the derangements in 
brain organization leading to the depersonalization syndrome … Cotard’s 
syndrome … body dysmorphic disorder … the eating disorders anorexia 
nervosa and bulimia nervosa … [and] body integrity disorder” (32). After 
spending most of their review going from one brain region to another 
summarizing what we know about their diff erent roles, not only in regard 
to awareness of one’s own body, but in regard to more general phenomena 
of body recognition (of others, in photographs, etc.), they go on to note 
the complexity and distributed nature of brain processes, and therefore 
the oversimplifi cation involved in looking at the isolated functions of 
brain parts. What follows from this, they rightly suggest, is that we should 
not expect to fi nd an isomorphism between brain processes representing 
the body and the body itself, despite some signifi cant somatotopical ele-
ments. I’m in full agreement on this point, but it is not the case that such 
isomorphism is “implied by the body schema and body image concepts.” 
To distinguish between body image and body schema, and to defi ne them 
in terms of perceptual processes and motor control processes, suggests 
nothing about what the neurological factors underpinning these processes 
should look like. Indeed, the dynamical nature of body schematic pro-
cesses involving interaction with the environment suggests that a narrow 
neurological account will never provide the full story.
As Berlucchi and Aglioti themselves realize, in regard to the ‘body in 
the brain’, neuroscience (at least using today’s technologies) runs into 
some clear limitations. First, to be clear, since the body schema involves 
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both central and peripheral nervous systems, there is certainly no hope in 
pointing to one or even a combination of brain areas to identify a body 
schema in the brain.7 Second, there is not, for example, simply one body 
map in the brain. Penfi eld’s homunculus in the somatosensory cortex 
(S1) is probably the best known; but there are other such homunculi in 
motor cortex and in subcortical areas, and likely partial maps in a variety 
of brain areas that iterate and reciprocally project to one another and to a 
vast number of other areas that are not explicitly body areas. As Jaak Pank-
sepp (1998) says of subcortical emotion areas, likewise, areas responsible 
for body schematic processes reiterate up, down, and across the brain in 
a complex dynamics. Just as recent reviews of the ‘self in the brain’ make 
clear that the self is seemingly everywhere and nowhere specifi c in the 
brain (see Gillihan and Farah 2005; Legrand and Ruby 2009; Vogeley and 
Gallagher 2011), something similar can be said of the body in the brain, 
which itself is not unrelated to those other iterated emotion processes and 
self processes. Th ird, processes related to body schema and body image are 
not simply interoceptive (including pain, temperature, itch, etc.), proprio-
ceptive, and exteroceptive (including vision and haptic touch), but also 
what we might call alteroceptive, that is, they are intersubjective. Moreover, 
in this regard, alteroceptive processes are not likely to be limited to mirror
neuron areas. 
We need to take seriously the idea that bodily self-awareness is some-
thing that is complicated by the fact that the body is always dynamically 
coupled with the environment, and that the environment includes, not just 
physical factors, but also social, intersubjective factors. Social and cultural 
dimensions impinge upon the formation and maintenance of both body 
image and body-schematic processes. Accordingly, we should not think 
that the full account of bodily self-awareness can be given in terms of ‘the 
body in the brain’, since the body is more properly in-the-world, as phe-
nomenologists like to say. All the more so, this idea has importance for 
understanding disruptions in bodily self-awareness in pathologies such as 
Depersonalization Syndrome, Cotard Delusion, Body Dysmorphic Dis-
order, the eating disorders Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa, Body 
Integrity Disorder, and so on. 
7. Th is, I think, must qualify what some identify as the third Copernican revolution (after 
Copernicus and Kant)—the idea that the brain generates the body and the body has nothing 
to do with it (Halligan 2002, who attributes this “Copernican” insight to Melzack who writes: 
“you do not need the body to feel the body” since the body is built into the brain [cited in 
Halligan 2002, 262]). 
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2. Intersubjective and social factors
Perhaps no one in the history of the use of the concepts of body image 
and body schema has done more damage in regard to the terminological 
confusion that continually motivates theorists like Berlucchi and Aglioti to 
throw up their hands and call for the abandonment of such concepts than 
Paul Schilder (1923, 1935). His very early use of the term ‘body image’ 
as equivalent to Head’s term ‘body schema’ started a long tradition of 
interchangeable use and confusion. Although he claims to be in agreement 
with Head, Schilder equates the postural model with the fi nal, conscious 
sensation of position. Th at is, he equates the body schema, as defi ned by 
Head, with the conscious image or representation of ‘our own body which 
we form in our mind’ (Schilder 1935, 11). He calls this representation a 
‘body image’ or ‘body schema’.
Th e image of the human body means the picture of our own body which we 
form in our mind, that is to say the way the body appears to ourselves … We 
call it a schema of our body or bodily schema, or, following Head … postural 
model of the body. Th e body schema is the tri-dimensional image everybody 
has about himself. We may call it ‘body-image’ (Schilder 1935, 11). 
According to Schilder this is a conscious picture constructed not 
only from sensory impressions but also from unconscious libidinous
elements.
Let me point another fi nger at Schilder, this time more positively to 
indicate something very important in his analysis. More than any other 
theorist, Schilder also highlights the social dimension that permeates our 
bodily movements and body awareness. For example, he makes this clear 
in his analysis of one of his paranoid schizophrenic patients who provided 
reports of her experience in delusional states in which she felt constantly 
violated by others—others would do things to her body with electricity; 
she focused on how others would interrupt her breathing, her food con-
sumption, and simple movement. She felt her own shoulder move when 
she saw the other person’s shoulder move. Schilder suggests that the patient 
“takes the postural models of others into her own” (215). Th e actions of 
others play out on her body image. Building on psychoanalytic theory, 
Schilder generalizes this idea.
I am of the opinion that the desire to be seen, to be looked at, is as inborn 
as the desire to see. Th ere exists a deep community between one’s own body-
image and the body-image of others. In the construction of the body-image 
115
there is a continual testing to discover what could be incorporated in the 
body…. Th e body-image is a social phenomenon (217). 
Schilder’s thought here infl uences Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of body 
schema and social intercorporeity. Th e latter idea he summarizes in this 
way: “between this phenomenal body of mine, and that of another as I 
see it from the outside, there exists an internal relation which causes the 
other to appear as the completion of the system” (1962, 352; see 1968, 
141, 143). Merleau-Ponty cites Schilder several times in his Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception, and at one point attributes to Schilder a principle of the 
body schema that Merleau-Ponty extends to his concept of intercorpore-
ity. “Schilder recognizes that such a complex is not the sum of its parts 
but is a new whole in relation to them” (Rojcewicz translation, 97, note 
157). Th ere is evidence, for example, that an agent’s bodily movement 
in the presence of others or in contexts of social interaction is diff erent 
and involves activation of diff erent brain areas, than when the agent acts 
alone. Th e fact that social gaze can change how objects are manipulated 
by an agent (Becchio et al. 2007; 2008), for example, suggests diff erences 
in the body-schematic control of action depending on whether actions are 
performed in social as compared to non-social contexts. Experiments by 
Schilbach et al. (2011) show modulation of reaction times for reaching in 
contexts that involve social gaze (i.e., when another person is looking at the 
agent). Th is suggests that such modulatory eff ects of social gaze on action 
control may contribute to the coordination of one’s actions with those of 
another agent (Schilbach et al., in press). In such cases, body-schematic 
processes are aff ected by very basic aspects of social contexts. It remains 
to be investigated how more complex contexts, and indeed, long-term 
cultural contexts, aff ect aspects of the body schema and via brain plastic-
ity may make body-schematic processes specifi c for diff erent cultures and 
intersubjective practices.8
Th is type of evidence may be taken to support a stronger claim that 
follows from Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercorporeity, namely, that the 
meaning of any individual’s actions will be intertwined with the other’s 
actions, and the co-constituted meaning will go beyond what either agent 
could contribute on his or her own. 1 + 1 > 2. We might call this the tango 
8. As Tony Marcel (personal correspondence) points out, one needs to be careful about 
diff erences between situations where there is a co-actor or an observer, and those without 
either present. In the latter cases the way in which the social domain enters into or aff ects body 
awareness and body control is quite diff erent, and may involve a developmental rather than an 
occurrent account.
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principle. Just as when two people dance the tango something irreducible 
to either one emerges through their interaction, so in all strongly embod-
ied social interaction, which is the most basic form of intersubjectivity 
(Gallagher 2001; 2005), what we have is not something that is simply 
additive. Th is holistic principle goes directly against the assumption of 
methodological individualism that informs most of the ongoing research 
about social cognition in psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience.
Methodological individualism: the assumption that social cognition 
depends on capabilities or mechanisms within an isolated individual, 
or on processes that take place inside an individual brain. (see Froese 
and Gallagher, under review).
Rehearsing the signifi cant amount of evidence from developmental psy-
chology, phenomenology, and dynamic systems modeling for the involve-
ment of embodiment in social cognition is beyond the scope of this paper 
(see e.g., De Jaegher et al. 2010; Gallagher 2007; 2008a; Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2008; Ratcliff e 2007). It involves debates about theory of mind 
and alternatives to standard approaches to these questions. But let me 
summarize the essential points that are relevant to the questions that 
concern us here.
1.  Developmental psychology shows us that from the very begin-
ning our relations to others are primarily embodied sensory-motor 
engagements involving imitation, emotion, eye contact, gesture, and 
dynamical and aff ective attunement and interaction. Th ese aspects 
are summarized under the headings of primary and secondary inter-
subjectivity in the literature (Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen and Hub-
ley 1978; Hobson 1993; Reddy 2008; see de Jaegher, Di Paulo, and 
Gallagher 2010). From birth the infant is pulled into these interactive 
processes. Th is can be seen in the very early behavior of the newborn. 
Infants from birth are capable of perceiving and imitating facial 
gestures presented by another (Meltzoff  and Moore 1977; 1994). 
Importantly, this kind of imitation is not an automatic or mechani-
cal procedure; Csibra and Gergely (2009) have shown, for example, 
that the infant is more likely to imitate only if the other person is 
attending to it.
2.  Th ese primary and secondary intersubjective processes are not left 
behind. Close analysis of facial expression, gesture and action in 
117
everyday contexts shows that as adults we continue to rely on embod-
ied interactive abilities to understand the intentions and actions of 
others and to accomplish interactive tasks (Lindblom 2007; Lindb-
lom and Ziemke 2007).
3.  In just such strong embodied interaction, often in imitative behavior, 
and in the practical and culturally determined tasks of everyday life 
(contexts that characterize secondary intersubjectivity starting at the 
age of 1 year), we learn what action is, and what our own possibilities 
for action are, by engaging with others.
Th is kind of interaction, which is intersubjective, pragmatic, and nor-
mative, requires body schematic coordination, not just within the indi-
vidual body, but synchronized in resonance with others, following either 
in-phase or phase-delayed behaviour, and in rhythmic co-variation of 
gestures, facial or vocal expressions (Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009; Gergely 
2001). Continuous movements between synchronised, desynchronised 
and the states in-between, drive the process (De Jaegher 2008). Attun-
ement, loss of attunement, and the process of re-establishing attunement 
maintain both diff erentiation and connection. With others, in such inter-
actions, we learn what we can do and can’t do, not just pragmatically in 
regard to skills that shape our body-schematic processes, but socially, and 
these various lessons inform our own self-conception, including the kind 
of evaluations that fi gure into the body image.
To be clear there are two claims here. First, that with respect to bodily 
awareness, and both body image and body schema, the intersubjective 
dimension is important. We can think here simply about social contexts 
that motivate self-consciousness about our bodily appearance, or about 
the deeper eff ects of culture on how we think about our bodies (see e.g., 
the discussion of anorexia, below), and even about how we move (see 
above). Second, following Merleau-Ponty, there is the stronger claim about 
intersubjectivity, namely the rejection of methodological individualism. To 
accept the fi rst claim does not commit one to accept the second claim. If, 
however, understanding others is at least partially grounded in embodied 
social interactions, and interaction as well as body-schematic processes 
are more than what occurs in the individual’s brain, as suggested above, 
approaches to social cognition that pursue methodological individualism 
are at least questionable.
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3. Disorders of embodiment
Coming back to those disorders that Berlucchi and Aglioti were so depressed 
about, I think one can get a good start at understanding them by using 
the body image—body schema distinction. Th is approach will set these 
various cases in an explanatory framework which will allow us to go in 
two diff erent directions at once: fi rst, pursuing the neuroscience as far as 
we can—something, however, that always ends up with an ambiguous 
and incomplete explanation, for reasons mentioned above; and second, 
abandoning the assumption of methodological individualism and taking 
seriously the idea that an analysis of individual brains will not give us 
the complete explanation. Th is involves acknowledging that the brain is 
embodied, that the body is always in an environment, that the environ-
ment is always social, as well as physical, and that the social aspects are 
simply not reducible to neurons fi ring in the brain, or beliefs and desires 
fl oating around in the mind. In this respect, too, I want to give up attempt-
ing to draw a line between the psychopathological and neuropathological. 
Some things clinically fall on one side rather than the other; but we might 
want to think of this as a continuum with most cases clustered around 
an ambiguous mid-point. Without trying to resolve this ambiguity, the 
following is an unsystematic look at some examples of how these various 
explanatory aspects might come together in the analysis of diff erent kinds 
of disorders.9 Th e purpose of this section is threefold. First, to address the 
worries expressed by Berlucchi and Aglioti about the usefulness of the 
concepts of body image and body schema for the analysis of pathologies. 
Second, to reinforce the importance of the social dimension for these con-
cepts. And third, to show that bodily self-awareness, and James’ notions 
of warmth and intimacy can be disrupted in serious ways.
Body-schematic processes allow us to engage in world-directed activity 
without attending to our body. Th is body-in-action, or body-as-subject, 
remains in large degree experientially absent. Th at is, as we engage in the 
world, we do not explicitly attend to our body as such, or perceptually 
monitor its movements in any explicit way. Implicit in this experiential 
absence, however, is a sense of ownership—a pre-refl ective sense that it is 
my body that is engaged in activity.10 If the body suddenly appears inad-
9. Th ere is no hope of discussing all such disorders. Vignemont (2010) lists 41 diff erent 
disorders of body awareness. A systematic discussion would have to address the majority of these.
10. Th e sense of ownership in this regard is self-specifi c, as defi ned by Legrand and Ruby 
2009 and Christoff  et al. 2011. 
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equate to the task, or becomes fatigued, or ill, or in some social situations 
where the presence of another person motivates a self-conscious attitude, 
I may come to notice what had been this experiential absence, but now 
replaced by a situation in which the body is attended to, or even feels “in 
the way.” In such cases, I may come to sense that my body has been func-
tioning all along, beneath the threshold of explicit awareness. I may also 
come to experience this loss of experiential absence in other more positive 
experiences—e.g., in physical exercise, through self-inspection, looking in 
the mirror, or in sexual arousal. In any of these cases, one’s body awareness 
normally includes a sense that the body in question is one‘s own.
Some pathological cases also involve this loss of experiential absence, 
but in a way that results in some alteration in the sense of ownership. Th e 
body is felt as something present, but more like an alien object than like the 
experiencing subject. In Depersonalization disorder patients may report 
a feeling of detachment from their body. In the Cotard Delusion some 
subjects claim they have died and that their body is decomposing. In such 
cases, however, there is not complete disownment since for such patients 
it remains their own body that they experience in this way. Th is abnormal 
presence of the body, however, is a curious form of self-consciousness. It 
alters the familiar sense of ownership for the body-as-subject, a minimal 
pre-refl ective self-awareness that may be generated, in part, by aspects of 
body-schematic processes involved in movement and action, and which 
then forms an important element of the perceptual body image.
So far the phenomenology. Some theorists have suggested that these 
kinds of experiential disturbances in what James calls the ‘warmth and 
intimacy’ of the body, may be due to disturbances in aff ect, where partial 
or entire neural networks of aff ective processing may be destroyed (Gerrans 
1999). With the loss of normal aff ect, the subject ceases to feel connected 
with her own body and comes to regard it as one object among others. 
Disorders in the aff ective aspect of the body image may also contribute to 
an account of disorders like anorexia nervosa. Although there is some gen-
eral agreement that anorexia involves distortions of the body image (Bruch 
1962), there is debate about whether the distortions are aff ective or per-
ceptual in nature (Fernández et al. 1999; Uys and Wassenaar 1996; Hen-
nighausen et al. 1999; Seeger et al. 2002). Th e neuroscience tells us that 
we should not see aff ect and perception as separate phenomena. Damasio 
(1994) and others have done much to disabuse us of the Cartesian view 
of aff ect as something that operates independently of cognitive function. 
Disruptions in aff ect likely involve disruptions in perceptual and cognitive/
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conceptual dimensions, and vice versa. Lambie and Marcel (2002) note, 
however, that ‘almost all the recent research [on emotion] concentrates on 
aspects of emotion experience that we would call self-focused rather than 
world-focused. Although Damasio (1994) includes mental images of what 
caused one’s emotion, much of his account … emphasizes experience of the 
body and of one’s “mode of cognitive processing”.’ In this regard too, the 
full account is not indicated by calling emotions such as pride and shame 
‘self-conscious’ or ‘refl exive’ without mentioning that the self-conscious 
or refl exive experience is motivated by others. Pride would be meaningless 
without its social meaning, and shame is obviously something that occurs 
before others (Sartre 2003; Zahavi 2010). More generally, however, as 
Schilder notes, “emotions are directed towards others. Emotions are always 
social” (218)—this is certainly the case with some emotions.
To say that Anorexia, and related disorders, involve the subject’s 
body image, or an over-objectifi ed bodily self-consciousness, is surely an 
incomplete story. Such disorders should be regarded as multidimensional 
(Legrand 2010) insofar as they also involve cultural and socially deter-
mined ideals of acceptable body shape. Susan Bordo (1993), for example, 
points to the importance of (1) religious and intellectual traditions that 
inform cultural attitudes about the body; (2) attitudes that involve gen-
der and power in cultural expression and advertising; and (3) the issue of 
control in the life circumstances of the individual patient. A holistic view, 
then, recognizes that all such aspects—perceptual, aff ective, conceptual, 
cultural, and social—are mutually implicated in a disorder like anorexia. 
Others have surely made this case; my point is simply to indicate that 
we can best understand why these things manifest themselves in terms 
of the body image by recognizing the essential role of social interaction 
(including cultural, normative, and aff ective aspects) in the generation and 
maintenance of body image. 
In addition, as we know from James, Damasio, and others, the whole 
body, and not just the brain, is implicated in the signature of emotion. 
Emotion involves not just a reiteration of subcortical patterns in cortical 
processes (Panksepp’s idea), but extra-neural reiterations as well, in the 
same way that body schema and body image are both neural and extra-
neural. What gets expressed bodily is not just the outward expression of 
an emotion that is generated fi rst in the brain; it may in fact run the other 
way: what happens in the brain may start as a reiteration of one’s action 
attitude keyed to certain emotion aff ordances in the environment, includ-
ing, of course other people. Reiterations that reach the cortex may be the 
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mid-point of emotion formation rather than its beginning point; and the 
formation is often not a private matter, but very much an intersubjective 
one (see Gallagher 2008b, Ch. 9).
All these factors have an impact on the ambiguous alteration in the 
self-awareness involved in senses of ownership and agency or control with 
respect to the body. In anorexia, the idea that others are aff ectively experi-
enced as “a violation of [the subject’s] personal sphere” (Giordano, 2002, 
4) and that anorexic subjects use their body to mediate their relations 
with others, motivates Legrand (2010) to suggest that “the perturbation 
of such bodily inter-subjectivity in anorexia reveals that, in normal cases 
too, the multidimensionality of one’s bodily self-consciousness is not a 
private solipsistic matter” (734).
Depersonalization (see Michal et al. 2005; 2006), Cotard Delusion, and 
Anorexia involve, in diff erent ways, disturbances in aff ect, intersubjective 
dynamics, and the ambiguous presence of the body as-object. In other 
disorders, more radical disruptions of the body image occur. Following 
stroke that aff ects the right parietal cortex, for example, the left side of the 
body can literally disappear from bodily self-awareness, with disruptions 
to the body image. In such cases of personal or unilateral neglect (e.g., 
Vallar 1993), there is neither a sense of presence, nor a sense of experiential 
absence, although, as noted above, in some cases there may be function of 
body schema. Other cases are complicated by paralysis and anosognosia 
(denial of the condition), and in cases of somatoparaphrenia the body 
appears to the patient to belong to someone else. Patients misidentify 
their arm or leg. Th ey famously complain that there is a strange leg in 
their bed, or that they can’t understand whose hand it is that is lying next 
to them, or they claim that it belongs to their husband or granddaughter 
(Feinberg 2001). 
Katerina Fotopoulou (private correspondence) reports on a stroke 
patient who claims that her paralyzed and deaff erented left arm belongs 
to her granddaughter. Th is is her response when she is asked about her arm 
and made to look at it. But when she is shown her full image in a mir-
ror, and asked about her left arm as it appears in the mirror, she correctly 
identifi es it as her own. When asked about her granddaughter’s arm she 
looks down, directly at her left arm. Whenever she looks directly at her 
arm, she identifi es it as her granddaughter’s; whenever she looks at it in 
the mirror she identifi es it as her own. Th e diff erence might be described 
as the diff erence between visual perception of the limb in the experiential 
canonical position (as we usually see our limbs) in the egocentric coordi-
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nates of our lived body (even if we visually focus on our left hand in this 
manner, it’s position corresponds to its canonical body-schematic position 
that is ready for action), and visual perception of the limb in an experiential 
non-canonical position, in object-centered coordinates, which includes 
perception of the body in the mirror. Th e latter is closer to the way that 
others perceive our body, and the way we perceive the other’s body.
I think there is a complicated story to tell here. We could likely appeal 
to the idea that diff erent brain areas may be responsible for these two 
diff erent kinds of perception, so one possible explanation is that the area 
of the parietal cortex, or the right posterior insula (see Baier & Karnath 
2008) damaged by stroke involves (or connects to) an area responsible for 
the canonical and coordinated body image/body schema, but not for our 
perception of the body in non-canonical (more objective) limb position, or 
the perception of other’s bodies.11 It’s a curious reversal. When the patient 
sees her own body as she usually sees it outside of the mirror, she attributes 
the body part to someone else; when she sees their own body as she sees 
others (and as others see her) she claim it as her own.
Schilder suggests that there is a “community … between my image in 
the mirror and myself ” which also implicates others (223). He off ers a 
simple experiment to show this. 
I sit about ten feet away from a mirror holding a pipe or a pencil in my hand 
and look into the mirror. I press my fi ngers tightly against the pipe and have a 
clear-cut feeling of pressure in my fi ngers. When I look intently at the image 
of my hand in the mirror I now feel clearly that the sensation of pressure is 
not only in my fi ngers in my own hand, but also in the hand which is twenty 
feet distant in the mirror. … Th e feeling is therefore not only in my actual 
hand but also in the hand in the mirror. (223–334).
Th is proposed experiment comes just after Schilder had referenced Th eo-
dore Lipps’ notion of Einfühlung, which is getting so much play today 
11. Berlucci and Aglioti (2010, 30) summarize the state of the art in this respect: “Experi-
mental evidence related to this question is contradictory. Recent fMRI studies by Hodzic et al. 
(2009) have reached the conclusion that EBA [extrastriate body area] is only involved in the 
analysis of body-related information but not in the assignment of body identity, insofar as it 
shows no diff erential activation to the presentation of unfamiliar or familiar bodies, including 
one’s own body. Other studies have suggested that EBA is activated more by allocentric than 
egocentric views of body parts (Chan et al. 2004; Saxe et al. 2006), and more by one’s own 
hand than by a stranger’s hand (Myers and Sowden 2008).” Th ere is some indirect evidence for 
precuneus and the posterior cingulate cortex being involved—Michielsen et al. 2010; or right 
superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the right superior occipital gyrus—Matthys et al. 2009)
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in the contemporary discussion of mirror neurons. I refrain from adding 
yet another solution to the overly long list of claims made about mirror 
neurons. Schilder highlights two things: (1) the cross modal infl uence 
of vision. In this regard, he suggests that “the experience of the [tactile] 
sensation in the mirror is as immediate and original as the experience in 
the real hand. It is at least very probably that part of these experiences are 
given when we see the bodies of others …” (224).12 (2) Schilder insists, 
however, that this is not projection, and he appeals to experiments con-
ducted by Landis on perception of emotion, to the eff ect that we can 
understand wholes much easier than we can understand isolated parts. 
Perhaps the image of the whole body in the mirror allows the stroke patient 
to attribute the limb to herself because she sees herself whole rather than 
in the canonical perspectival angle that for the most part is ignored as 
we act in the world (the normal experiential absence). Looking directly 
at her hand, from the fi rst-person perspective of the agent, when in fact 
she cannot do anything with it, when it will not obey, failure of the sense 
of ownership does not seem so surprising; but looking in the mirror and 
seeing the hand in the context of the whole body, from a third-person 
perspective, and as someone else would see her, she clearly recognizes 
it as her own hand. Why, in the former case, the hand is attributed to 
someone else—a relative or friend or doctor—is a more diffi  cult ques-
tion to answer, and here if we followed Schilder we would likely take a
psychoanalytic route. 
Let me note, however, coming at all of this from a diff erent angle, 
that recovery of function following stroke is facilitated by social context. 
Marcel (1992) has shown that degree of recovery is correlated to diff er-
ent intentions associated with semantic or pragmatic context, and social 
context (see Gallagher and Marcel 1999). In situations where the subject 
is instructed to carry out decontextualized, meaningless actions (e.g., in 
experimental setting, physical examination, or simple motor rehabilita-
tion exercises), performance is poor, compared to situations that involve 
some kind of goal-oriented or meaningful action (e.g., drinking at a meal, 
washing dishes, writing to dictation). In these situations performance is 
better. But performance is best (sometimes approaching fl uency) when 
actions are personally signifi cant or derive their signifi cance from the 
social and cultural setting (e.g., serving tea to friends, writing in a diary). 
12. Th ere is something to be said here in reference to the dominance of vision in the rubber 
hand illusion, which clearly involves the notion of the sense of ownership for a body part, in 
this case incorporating a limb that does not belong to one’s body. 
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My point here is simply that if social aspects of experience play some role 
in recovery, they may also play some role in how bodily self-awareness is 
shaped in the actual pathology.
A diff erent sort of disruption of bodily self-awareness may be caused by 
lesions that result in Anarchic Hand Syndrome (AHS), a clinical disorder 
in which the patient’s hand performs actions that are not under his/her 
control. Th e actions may appear to a third-person observer to be purpose-
ful, although the patient describes the actions as involuntary. When AHS 
is associated with the split brain, it sometimes leads theorists to the radical 
interpretation that there are two independent centers of self-consciousness, 
one in each hemisphere, which are normally and pragmatically integrated 
via the corpus callosum, but which can be shown to be separate in the 
correct experimental setting. Yet AHS doesn’t manifest with dissociated 
self-awareness. Th e sense of ownership (as part of the body image) is still 
intact—this is my arm that is acting up—while the sense of agency or 
control over my arm (generated by body-schematic processes) is disrupted. 
Th e movements may be accompanied by a feeling of foreignness and some-
times by the personifi cation of the aff ected limb (Tow and Chua 1998). It 
is as if the arm belongs to someone else. But, in contrast to schizophrenic 
patients with delusions of control, AHS patients do not think someone else 
is performing the action; rather, it is “as if” someone else were controlling 
arm, or simply, that there is something wrong with their arm (Frith and 
Gallagher, 2002; Gallagher and Marcel, 1999; Della Sala, 2000).
In the disorders of the schizophrenia spectrum, the normally tacit 
aspects of automatic body-schematic processes are sometimes transformed 
into explicit aspects in a process that Louis Sass (1992, 2000) calls ‘hyper-
refl exion’. A disruption in processes of action preparation (corresponding 
to neurological problems in body-schematic control) may disrupt the sense 
of agency for such action, and motivate a hyperrefl exive focus on precisely 
aspects of movement that are normally tacit. Body-schematic functions 
are in most non-pathological cases, tacitly performed; as indicated above, 
the body-in-action tends to eff ace itself. Overly attending to our bodily 
movements makes them seem almost mechanical, and in some way alien. 
Th is sense of “being outside of the performance,” makes one feel uneasy. 
Instead of simply driving, or walking, or breathing, for example, schizo-
phrenic patients with delusions of control may start to think about the 
specifi c details of how they drive, or walk, or breathe. Th ey experience 
and verbalize the body-schematic processes that are normally tacit and 
automatically functioning in activity.
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In Gallagher and Vaever (2004), for example, we reported on a young 
male patient who indicates he has to think about how to breathe; another 
patient reports that he has to “think about how to walk, how to move his 
legs, how fast to walk, whether he should stick to the right or the left on 
the sidewalk, whether to look up or down when walking.” In such cases 
the patient lives in a way detached from his own lived performances. Th e 
bodily functions become mechanical. Th e agent takes himself or some 
aspect of himself as an object of awareness. Hyperrefl exivity, Sass (1992; 
2000) argues, means that the normally tacit, body-schematic processes of 
embodied activity can no longer perform the grounding, orienting, and 
constituting functions that they normally do. One patient states: “Some-
times I can’t sense my own body. Th e sense of having a body … Normally 
one does sense one’s body.” Another patient says: “I simply don’t have any 
body sensation anymore, no feeling of the body still belonging to me. I 
sense that I’m sitting here, but it is an alien feeling.” (Gross et al. 1987) 
Tellingly, the same sense of alienation seems to permeate the subject’s 
relations with others.
I don’t say the right things, I am acting, it is a play, and I try so hard that I 
fall over.
I am not interested in other people, and I can’t put myself in their place, it 
makes me a bad person.
I live in my head a lot, I drift away, thoughts come up, and I think of them, I 
am not listening, I just say yes and no. (Cited in Gallagher and Vaever 2004).
Th is suggests a possible correlation between problems with social interac-
tion and motor or body-schematic problems. Just such problems exist in 
autistic children between ages 3 and 10 (see Damasio and Maurer, 1978; 
Vilensky, Damasio, and Maurer 1981) and even before that, in infants 
who are later diagnosed as autistic (Teitelbaum et al. 1998). If we take 
social interaction to be an embodied process, then problems that aff ect 
bodily movement, and bodily self-awareness would implicate diffi  culties 
in interaction at very basic levels.
Th is has been an incomplete and rather unsystematic review. One 
project would be to make it more systematic and to explore precisely the 
relations between body image, body schema, social interactions, cognition, 
aff ect, and neurological disruptions. Should such relations be categorized 
as merely correlational, or more strongly as causal; should they be regarded 
as constitutional for some of these pathologies? Clearly more empirical 
work is required to answer these questions. What I hope to have shown, 
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however, or at least suggested, is (1) the minor premise: that body image 
and body schema may still be productive concepts in sorting out some 
of this; (2) the major premise: that our understanding of such patholo-
gies will be incomplete if we look only at the neurology and ignore the 
phenomenology, especially the phenomenology of intersubjectivity; and 
(3) the conclusion: in regard to bodily self-awareness, we need a more 
holistic and integrative approach, one that recognizes the importance of 
social function as well as brain function, and accounts for how these two 
meet up in our bodies.
4. James’ solutions
In conclusion, let me briefl y bring these rather unsystematic consider-
ations back to the problems that James was addressing in his Principles 
of Psychology. In describing the social self, James makes no reference to 
the role played by the body in our interactions with others. In passing, 
however, he hints at something we have just seen, specifi cally in regard to 
Anorexia. He suggests that if we were totally ignored by others, if we ran 
into complete disappointment in our relations with others, the “cruel-
lest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, 
however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to 
be unworthy of attention at all” (294). He doesn’t consider, however, that 
we might infl ict those tortures on ourselves. In the less extreme dealings 
with normal everyday life, however, he does note that as we encoun-
ter diff erent people we may act diff erently, and indeed, adopt diff erent 
postures and gaits, swaggering “like a pirate,” for example, among our 
“tough young friends”—something we can all relate to. Th ere is, however, 
much more that we can say in regard to the material, the social, and the
spiritual self. 
James plants the spiritual self squarely in the bodily processes that gen-
erate a basic bodily self-consciousness—albeit the pre-refl ective feeling of 
‘warmth and intimacy’. We’ve now seen, however, that this warmth and 
intimacy can go cold and for the most part is not an exclusive intimacy. 
Our bodily self-consciousness can turn from the warm glow of familiarity, 
to the fl at aff ect of an alien object, in some cases due to purely contingent 
disruptions in brain process, and in other cases due to long-developing 
failures in intersubjective relations or the noxious eff ects of certain cul-
tural forces. Th ese disruptions and contortions of bodily self-awareness, 
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as well as our normal everyday experiences, play out in terms that can be 
described in the vocabulary and grammar of body image and body schema, 
and in ways that reiterate in a complex neural and non-neural dynamics 
that involves dimensions of emotion, cognition, and our relations with 
others. If the warmth and intimacy of bodily self-awareness is the basis for 
our sense of personal identity, as James suggests, then we can also see how 
personal identity is not a purely autonomous or individual accomplish-
ment; it takes shape in contexts that are always intersubjective and social, 
and is more vulnerable for it.
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